Ole Peters (INTJ)

Ole Peters

Type: INTJ

 Profession: Mathematician

Subtype: Dominant (+Fe fixation)

Born: ?

Generation: Gen X?

Nationality: German?

"It's very easy, when working on complex problems, to have an attractive but wrong idea, derive another wrong idea. Before you know it you have a wrong self-perpetuating culture."
Ole Peters


Although not as immediately apparent as in interviews, a person’s type shines through in the work they create as well.  Notice the content, themes, and approach Ole uses in his work.  What light can this shed on the mind of INTJs in general?

An evolutionary advantage of cooperation

Abstract: Cooperation is a persistent behavioral pattern of entities pooling and sharing resources. Its ubiquity in nature poses a conundrum. Whenever two entities cooperate, one must willingly relinquish something of value to the other. Why is this apparent altruism favored in evolution? Classical solutions assume a net fitness gain in a cooperative transaction which, through reciprocity or relatedness, finds its way back from recipient to donor. We seek the source of this fitness gain. Our analysis rests on the insight that evolutionary processes are typically multiplicative and noisy. Fluctuations have a net negative effect on the long-time growth rate of resources but no effect on the growth rate of their expectation value. This is an example of non-ergodicity. By reducing the amplitude of fluctuations, pooling and sharing increases the long-time growth rate for cooperating entities, meaning that cooperators outgrow similar non-cooperators. We identify this increase in growth rate as the net fitness gain, consistent with the concept of geometric mean fitness in the biological literature. This constitutes a fundamental mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. Its minimal assumptions make it a candidate explanation of cooperation in settings too simple for other fitness gains, such as emergent function and specialization, to be probable. One such example is the transition from single cells to early multicellular life.

Insurance Makes Wealth Grow Faster

Abstract: Voluntary insurance contracts constitute a puzzle because they increase the expectation value of one party’s wealth, whereas both parties must sign for such contracts to exist. Classically, the puzzle is resolved by introducing non-linear utility functions, which encode asymmetric risk preferences; or by assuming the parties have asymmetric information. Here we show the puzzle goes away if contracts are evaluated by their effect on the time-average growth rate of wealth. Our solution assumes only knowledge of wealth dynamics. Time averages and expectation values differ because wealth changes are non-ergodic. Our reasoning is generalisable: business happens when both parties grow faster.

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